How convincing is the evidence for the effectiveness of drone strikes?

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have become a key policy tool of the United States (US) to target and commit attacks on various insurgent or terrorist organisations, to ultimately subdue the threat of terrorism. This has been particularly prevalent in regions across the Middle East, specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan and later expanding into Somalia and Yemen (Jaeger & Siddique 2018, p. 667). The perceived success of this tool has caused a significant rise in the use of drone attacks, particularly under the Obama administration, as the US Central Intelligence Agency and its military employ it as its main ‘lawful’ global policy tool. This fundamentally altered the way in which the US engages in its counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations, favoured for reducing troops on the ground and minimising placing US military personnel at risk (Walsh 2013). Such targets are generally militant leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups found in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Northwest Pakistan (Jaeger & Siddique 2018, p. 667). To date, a minimum of 14,040 strikes by the US military have been confirmed (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism n.d.). We apply scholar Mir’s (2016) conceptualisation of ‘effectiveness’ grounded in the author’s Legibility and Speed-of-Exploitation System (L&S) framework in order to determine the effectiveness of US counter-terrorism programmes conducted across the Middle East (Mir 2016, p. 47). Accordingly, this paper argues that drone strikes as a counter-terrorism tool have not been wholly effective in their aims. This paper makes novel contributions to the study of drone strikes as a counter-terrorism tool. First, we broaden the focus to include civilian security (not originally applied in Mir’s (2016) framework). In turn, we suggest that policymakers should commit to protecting civilians for both normative and strategic reasons, emphasizing its importance in conducting an effective counter-terrorism campaign. Second, this paper defines and disaggregates effectiveness and ineffectiveness with regards to drone strike counter-terrorism campaigns. At both a political and academic level, policymakers and academics have largely failed to provide a comprehensive understanding of what it means to conduct an effective campaign. This has implications for how the US military seeks to carry out future interventions in their war on terror.

Defining Effectiveness

We pose the question, whether or not drones are effective in both targeting terrorist members and subsequently producing tangible security gains for the United States?

 The Obama administration has argued that drones are certainly a highly effective strategy. The security gains are indisputable and have become the “only game in town,” according to the Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (Boyle 2014, p. 137). In 2011, Panetta stated that drones have drastically increased American counter-terrorism efforts so radically that it is likely the United States will “strategically defeat Al Qaeda” (Boyle 2014, p. 137). Thus, making the claim that drones produce effective outcomes when neutralising Al Qaeda (Boyle 2014, p. 137).

Nonetheless, interpreting the effectiveness of drones is more complex than simply what the Obama administration suggests it to be. In academic and policymaking circles, a drone strikes effectiveness is rarely defined (Boyle 2014, p. 137). Are drone strikes perceived as effective if they produce only tactical gains, for example, a strike that leads to the deaths of terrorist targets? What are the associated or potential long-term strategic costs of such strikes? How should effectiveness be operationalized and measured? The Obama administration’s statements about the effectiveness of drone strikes often conflated as both tactical and strategic gains, suggesting without the use of empirical evidence that they are the same (Boyle 2014, p. 137).

What the Obama administration failed to acknowledge is that this neglects some important measurement issues, such as how would the United States confirm that it had acquired a tangible security gain from a drone strike? Mir (2016, p. 50) utilizes the L&S framework in order to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism. First, the state launching the counter-terrorism campaign must identify and locate said terrorists from within the population. Second, the same state must react to the changing nature of the terrorist group, who are consistently trying to avoid detection, change identities, and operate under extreme secrecy. The framework analyses the state’s (who initiated the counter-terrorism attack) ability to respond accordingly to these two issues (Mir 2016, p. 50). For the purposes of brevity, this paper solely focuses on and employs how counter-terrorism ‘effectiveness’ has been disaggregated, according to the author. A counter-terrorism campaign is considered ineffective if the targeted group’s operation capability improves through; maintenance of collective-action efforts, existing bases hold and the establishment of new ones, and political relationships with other armed groups are consolidated, for example, through mergers or alliances. Conversely, a counter-terrorism campaign is classified as effective if the targeted group losses large amounts of operational capability through the loss of bases, collective action breaks down and if political relationships with other armed forces begin to dissolve (Mir 2018, p. 50). We examine this concept across the Middle Eastern region.

Collective-Action Efforts – Maintained or Broken Down?

The Obama administration has argued that drone strikes have been incredibly useful with respect to decapitating high ranking leaders within Al Qaeda and placing the organisation under severe pressure (Boyle 2014, p. 140). As a Taliban operative stated in 2016, although jihad will never be eliminated, the drone strikes greatly weakened and severely impacted the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Mir 2016). This was also reinforced by former President Obama, as he stated in a speech at the National Defense University in 2013, that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining members are forced to spend the majority of their time thinking about their own safety. Between September 2019 to August 2020, US drone strikes eliminated top leaders within ISIS and al-Qaeda, including Qassim al Rimi, founder and emir of Al Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate, killed by a US airstrike in Yemen, and Khalid al Aruri, deputy emir and de facto leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, killed by a US drone strike in Syria (Hanna & Nada 2020). Moreover, documents found in Osama bin Laden’s home in Abbottabad following his death showed that he had advised his fellow associates to immediately leave the region of Waziristan in northwestern Pakistan to avoid drones (Boyle 2014, p. 141). To this, he encouraged a range of operational security measures such as infrequently travelling via roads, moving on overcast days when drones had poorer sight and careful movements that avoided the attraction of attention (Boyle 2014, p. 141). While the administrations have been successful in removing top operational leadership, this does not suggest drone strikes are effective merely from the elimination of terrorist leaders.

We suggest that this has forced terrorist organisations to evolve. As the International Crisis Group (2016) states, the affiliates remain stronger and more potent than ever. The patterns of radicalisation vary among villages, countries, and individuals, suggesting that Al-Qaeda has transformed from its once hierarchical terrorist group into a brand that numerous groups can adapt accordingly to fit their purposes. While drones may have placed terrorist groups under intense organisational pressure, this may have produced this unexpected and unintended result (Boyle 2014, p. 141). Rather than forcing these groups to dismantle, drones perhaps encouraged their fragmentation into a variety of regional and community level affiliates such as al Shabab, the Somali militant group, the Haqqani Network, a semi-autonomous group of the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e- Taliban in Pakistan and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, to list a few. This scattering dynamic has produced factions and encouraged members to relocate and expand into other regions. Although their organisational leadership and perhaps capacities have been reduced in specific areas, the impact of drones on these terrorist groups as a whole is far less evident (CRS 2020). Overall, collective-action efforts have been maintained.

In turn, this forced the use of Predator and Reaper drones’ deployment to expand, to ensure that the CIA had ample rapid-strike capability without having to sacrifice their routine aerial surveillance missions as it had done in the past (Guardian 2019). This capability improvement was important on two accounts. First, the US government issued the CIA with significant leeway in pursuing strikes on unknown targets further consolidated by the Inter-Services Intelligence’s agreeance to enable the military to do so at times and locations of their choice (Mir 2016, p. 62). Second, and most importantly, US policy was amended to allow broader mission targets and loosening of restraints, as opposed to only targeting “high-value” leaders (Mir 2016, p. 62). As a result, some individuals are targeted in ‘personality strikes’ whereby the operator must have a great level of certainty that they are targeting the intended individual based upon sources such as cell phone interceptions and ground-based informants (Keene 2015, p. 24). In other cases, the US will conduct ‘signature strikes’ where unknown individuals, particularly in groups, are targeted after operators observe certain patterns of behaviour (Keene 2015, p. 24). They become targets if the operators believe them to be associated with terrorist activities (Fair 2016; Keene 2015, p. 25). We suggest this shows ample evidence that although top leadership may have been successfully decapitated, this does not imply that collective-action efforts have been disbanded, dismantled, nor reduced; rather it has encouraged such groups to organise differently.

Existing Bases & Political Relationships?

When strikes have been conducted, namely signature strikes when the target’s identity is unknown, room for margin of error is significant and can subsequently lead to civilian causalities. Some researchers have argued that this has produced a ‘blowback’. The blowback thesis suggests that drone strikes kill more innocent civilians in the process than they do terrorists (Shah 2016). Subsequently, the affected populations resort to radicalisation and thus are motivated to join terrorist organisations in order to retaliate against the United States (Shah 2016).

Many scholars have contributed to the literature regarding the relationship between the use of drone strikes and various types of behaviour by insurgent and terrorist groups with links to Pakistan (Walsh 2013). A somewhat consistent result across the research indicates that drone strikes have minimal influence, both positive and negative, on the level of insurgent violence that occurs within Afghanistan. Perhaps, a more concrete conclusion resulting from these studies is that drone strikes that cause civilian deaths appear to have very little links to leading to greater insurgent violence. Additionally, evidence in Pakistan does not indicate increases in recruitment following drone strikes (Shah 2016). Field interviews conducted in a regional town showed that 79% of Pakistani locals surveyed in areas most affected by the operations endorsed these campaigns, and 64% of participants believed they accurately targeted militants (Shah 2016). Shah (2016), the researcher, claims that there is no evidence to show a significant impact of drone strikes on either local nor national recruitment of terrorist members (Ahmad & Madiha 2016). The Obama administration supports these findings, stating that blowback is unlikely given that drone strikes are incredibly precise and tend to result in minimal civilian casualties.

Much of the existing debate within political and academic spheres conflates the idea of drone strikes as precise and accurate. However, these are two separate notions. Precision refers to the ability of forces to identify, track and evaluate a range of targets or objectives across the full range of military operations; this does not imply accuracy when targeting an organisation’s members (ICG 2013). This misunderstanding is further enforced by media narratives that utilise phrases such as ‘pin-point accuracy’, the debate has often implied that if drones are precise, they are clearly effective (ICG 2013). The specific number of deaths or injuries caused by drone strikes are particularly difficult to measure and verify and, therefore, cannot be accurately calculated. Particularly, this is evident in Afghanistan, whereby drone strikes often occur during combat operations. Therefore, identifying who was killed by drone strikes versus other modes is almost impossible (Boyle 2014, p. 142). The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (n.d.) suggests that a total of 2,515-4,026 individuals were killed in Pakistan, with anywhere between 424-969 of those being civilians. Moreover, in Yemen, reports suggest that a total of 1,020-1,389 individuals were killed, with anywhere between 174-225 of those being civilians (Bureau of Investigative journalism n.d.). This data is somewhat easier to collect as estimates are more readily available. However, the ungoverned territories in which these strikes occur often mean there are limited opportunities to interview survivors or even count the deceased (Boyle 2014, p. 142). This has been made more complex by former President Donald Trump’s revoking of then-President Obama’s 2016 executive order. This policy required US officials to issue the number of civilians who were killed as a result of drone strikes. In turn, this has reduced transparency and loosened reporting requirements (BBC 2019). Additionally, it is a common understanding that terrorist organisations can inflate casualty figures for propaganda means (Boyle 2014, p. 141). While data indicates that the accuracy of drones is drastically improving over time, and the rates of civilian casualties from drone strikes have decreased, we emphasise that drone precision does not equate to effectiveness.

This has led to a differing conclusion that is drawn regarding the blowback thesis. Some scholars instead argue that drone strikes that kill militants within Pakistan are, in fact, associated with causing greater subsequent insurgent violence in the region (Boyle 2014, p. 141). Likewise, in Yemen, some evidence suggests that drone strikes increased local recruitment within terrorist groups (Foust 2013, p. 12). For example, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) grew from its original membership of 23 militants to upwards of 300 individuals by the end of 2009. US officials then stated that by mid-2012, AQAP was roughly more than 1000 members with networks in Al Qaeda and Pakistan. US airstrikes in Yemen drastically increased during 2009 and 2012 (Foust 2013, p. 12). These findings are further corroborated by the Stimson Center, a Washington DC think tank that found that extremist groups influence has only increased (Al Jazeera 2014). The ‘blowback’ from drones has become a “potent recruiting tool for terrorist organisations,” specifically within Yemen and Pakistan (Al Jazeera 2014). Further, CIA officers who have been heavily involved in these drone campaigns have also been privately stressing their concern for the blowback effect - noting that drone strikes are effectively utilised by Al Qaeda and its allies to recruit more members (Porter 2010). This is predominantly due to the notion that drone strikes kill civilians, bystanders and leaders, which infuriates other civilians, specifically Muslim males, thus encouraging them to join the movement (Porter 2010). The CIA informants stated that men in tribal regions of Pakistan perceive Americans to be both “cowards and weasels”, demonstrating the unfavourability of US intervention (Porter 2010). In conjunction with this, the resulting death and destruction of the drone strikes are used by terrorist recruiters as the propaganda images to gain traction among the Muslim masses (Al Jazeera 2014). This finding could illustrate a dynamic in which individuals or members of an already existing insurgent group may feel threatened by drone strikes and attempt to find aid from other insurgent groups, establishing political relationships among regional terror organisations (Walsh 2013).

Moreover, we also believe it is important to highlight the flaws that have become apparent in Shah’s (2016) field research, both in theory and empirically. Ahmad (2016) disagrees with the claims made by Shah (2016) as he mischaracterises arguments of opponents, incorrectly implies overall representation of his study and utilises a misleading and flawed methodology. Although it is important to acknowledge that it is difficult to claim that drones are the key cause for either increasing or dismantling terrorist groups due to the variety of extenuating factors (structural or otherwise), US officials have stated that the flow of recruits to terror groups has risen (Foust 2013, p. 12). We, therefore, find evidence to suggest that the blowback thesis may be evident, whereby drone strikes could be driving terrorist groups expansion, undermining their use as an effective counter-terrorism tool. The empirical results of US counter-terrorism campaigns and the link between the blowback thesis produce highly differing and controversial findings, illustrating varied and complex dynamics. Nonetheless, we suggest that it is relatively safe to imply that sufficient evidence demonstrates that drone’s strategic utility has been somewhat undermined to varying degrees. Namely, they have provoked anger and retaliation across social, tribal and family relations of their victims (Boyle 2014, p. 141). Moreover, with respect to the political costs, drone strikes have fueled levels of hostility against the United States, which have the potential to endanger and destabilise any political cooperation in the Middle Eastern region (Boyle 2014, p. 141).

Discussion

This paper has argued that US drone strikes as a counter-terrorism tool have proven to be somewhat ineffective through the utilisation of Mir’s (2016) specific L&S framework. Specifically, we find in accordance with the author’s definition of effectiveness, drone strikes have largely maintained terrorist groups collective action efforts, existing bases have held, or we have seen the expansion of new and larger groups, and political relationships with other armed groups have been consolidated. These findings have important outcomes for the US military and policymakers. Firstly, drone strikes are a useful option for decapitating top leadership of terrorist organisations (Mir 2016, p. 82). This has appeared to be successful for the Obama administration in foiling some Al Qaeda driven terrorist plots on US homeland, for instance. If this is a strategic priority for US policymakers, then drone strike campaigns may be useful to achieve these short-term and immediate goals. However, in turn, we have seen terrorist groups evolve from these drone developments, and thus the rise of terrorist factions is evident. They are no longer a solely hierarchical organisation dependent upon key leadership personnel (Mir 2016, p. 82). This has led to a dispersion and organisational reshuffle and has not necessarily weakened their capabilities. Second, the political costs are particularly high and have significant detrimental long-term consequences. As evidenced in both Yemen and Pakistan, the US drone strike campaigns have been widely unpopular, demonstrating evidence of the blowback thesis and, in fact, fueling terrorist recruitment. The adverse effects from the use of drone strikes are not likely to outweigh any potential positive counter-terrorism gains that are made. In summation, this paper acknowledges that drone strikes are not an effective counter-terrorism tool.

We appreciate that this framework is limited in its acknowledgement of international law, morality and ethical implications. This paper suggests that further research is encouraged to incorporate into Mir’s (2016) framework a broader definition of effectiveness. The continuous decoupling of civilian security and efficacy within scholarship is incredibly harmful at both a strategic (blowback thesis) and normative (morality and ethics) level. We argue that civilian protection should be considered essential for drone strike effectiveness. In turn, if this method continues to be deployed, policymakers need to find approaches that will minimise or eliminate civilian harm and provide protection. America’s intensive and extreme reliance on drone strike campaigns as a counter-terrorism tool is grounded upon questionable assumptions. Moreover, largely it has been responsible for the rise of instability, escalating conflicts and for the changing of the militant landscape, arguably failing to produce real long-term tangible security gains for the US (Al Jazeera 2014).  

References

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